This paper presents a direct adaptive recon"gurable #ight control approach and demonstrates its e!ectiveness via an application to an advanced tailless "ghter aircraft. The recon"gurable control law is based on a dynamic inversion controller in an explicit model following architecture. An on-line neural network is used to adaptively regulate the error between the desired response model and the actual vehicle response. An on-line control allocation scheme generates individual control e!ector commands to yield the moments commanded by the controller, while prioritizing critical axes and optimizing performance objectives such as maneuver load alleviation. An on-line system identi"cation module generates estimates of the vehicle's stability and control derivatives for use in control allocation and command limiting. The recon"gurable control laws are demonstrated by comparing their performance to a dynamic inversion control law when unknown failure/damage are induced.
INTRODUCTION
Recon"gurable #ight control refers to the ability of a control system to adapt to unknown failures and damage. This expands on the capability of many currently "elded systems (e.g. F/A-18), where the control laws adapt to failures identi"ed by the failure detection and isolation (FDI) algorithms to provide safe operation and desirable handling qualities. Undetectable failures and damage are accommodated only through the inherent robustness of the control laws with no guarantees of stability or good handling qualities. As a result, recon"gurable control laws o!er obvious enhancements in #ight safety and mission e!ectiveness.
Recon"gurable #ight control has received considerable attention in recent literature, and several approaches have been proposed. The self-repairing #ight control system achieved failure This paper presents an overview of the TAFA aircraft and its critical failure and damage modes. Recon"gurable control laws using the direct adaptive control architecture are developed for the TAFA vehicle and evaluated at several key operating conditions. Additional details on the models, #ight control system design, and analysis are provided in Boeing's RESTORE system design report.
TAFA AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION
The TAFA aircraft is a conceptual design of an advanced "ghter con"guration which blends an extensive suite of conventional and innovative control e!ectors to achieve high agility in a low observable design. The TAFA is a single engine, single seat "ghter designed for air-to-air and/or air-to-ground missions.
The TAFA airframe is characterized by a chined forebody, symmetric air inlets, and no vertical tail. The wing and all moving canard are thin and feature a moderate aft sweep and no dihedral. The leading edge of the wing is equipped with passive porosity which can be used as a low rate roll control device during covert maneuvers.
The trailing edge of the wing features ailerons, trailing edge #aps and aft body split #aps. The trailing edge #aps provide a powerful pitch control e!ector which can also be de#ected di!erentially to augment the ailerons during rolling maneuvers. If necessary, the #aps and ailerons can be de#ected in opposing directions to generate yawing moments without inducing roll. The aft body split #aps are &clamshell' devices which consist of two panels on each side of the aircraft. One panel opens above the wing and the other below the wing to produce yawing moments while inducing very little roll. The all moving canards are used as a low-rate trim device for performance optimization, but also provide supplementary yaw control power through di!erential de#ections. In addition, the canards generate substantial nose down control capability to help meet control margin requirements at high angles of attack.
The TAFA is powered by a moderate bypass ratio turbofan engine equipped with axi-symmetric thrust vectoring. The pitch and yaw thrust vectoring enhance maneuvering capabilities and stability augmentation. In addition, main engine thrust is routed to forebody ports for pneumatic control. The ports are mounted to serve as a yaw control device. The mission scenarios and critical maneuvers for evaluating the recon"gurable control laws are based on requirements for a low-signature, Class-IV light-attack or strike-"ghter aircraft, and were selected from the mission pro"le of Figure 2 . Powered approach, air combat maneuvering, low altitude ingress/egress, and high-speed supercruise mission segements were selected. The maneuvers performed during these mission phases have been selected to fully utilize the available control power of the aircraft and to provide su$cient challenge for the system identi"cation, recon"guration, and control allocation algorithms.
The recon"gurable control laws must provide stability and good handling qualities during normal operation, as well as under failures and damage. The failure modes are classi"ed, depending on the severity of the failure or damage, as Class 1 (C1) and Class 2 (C2), and correspond to the requirement to meet Level 2 or 3 #ying qualities. These classi"cations correspond very closely to the operational states II and III de"ned in MIL-F-9490D. Class 1 incidents include either minor damage or single failures, where the actuator/control e!ector responds to the failure as designed. Several examples are (1) ratcheting of the surface to a zero position, (2) &#oating' in a damped-trail mode, or (3) locking at the de#ection where failure occurred. Also included are minor damage scenarios which result in partial (physical) loss of a control e!ector.
Class 2 includes any combination of two Class 1 incidents, plus situations in which the actuator is unable to respond to the failure as designed. Hard-over failure of an e!ector to its maximum position, for example, will likely require constant use of a comparable surface for trim alone, e!ectively disabling two e!ectors. Likewise, complete loss of a large all-moving surface (e.g. trailing edge #ap) is a signi"cant damage state, and may also be evaluated under the less severe #ying qualities requirements.
The large control e!ector suite of the TAFA aircraft results in a large number of potential failure and damage conditions. In order to streamline veri"cation and validation of the recon"gurable control laws, an e!ort was performed to identify the critical failure and damage conditions at each of the #ight conditions. These critical failure and damage conditions are the primary conditions used to evaluate the performance of the recon"gurable control laws. Selection of the critical failure and damage conditions was based on an achievable dynamics analysis of candidate failure/damage con"gurations. Classes 1 and 2 conditions which allowed the #ying qualities objectives (Level 2 for C1 failure and Level 3 for C2 failure) to be met through optimal use of the remaining control e!ectors were selected for subsequent analysis. The critical failure and damage conditions are tabulated along with the vehicle's static stability characteristics under these conditions in Figure 3 .
RECONFIGURABLE CONTROL LAWS
The proposed recon"gurable control law architecture is shown in Figure 4 . It is based on a dynamic inversion control law in an explicit model following framework.
The on-line neural network adaptively regulates the inversion error between the plant model assumed by the control law and the true aircraft. Inversion errors may be due to modelling uncertainties, or induced by failures/damage. The neural network detects that an inversion error is present by monitoring the tracking error between a desired response model and the true aircraft. Large errors will cause the network to augment the desired dynamics input to the inverting controller with a signal which attempts to cancel the inversion error. The neural network has the ability to stabilize the vehicle following failures/damage without requiring system identi"cation estimates of the stability and control derivatives. This reduces the criticality of system identi"cation in the overall recon"gurable control law. The neural network's stabilizing characteristics are supported by an analytical proof of stability. Details of the neural network controller and performance results are provided by Calise et al.
The neural controller models the inversion error using a basis function expansion implemented via a sigma-pi neural network. The network weights are updated on-line (no pre-training of the network) using a weight adaptation law derived from Lyapunov stability theory. Figure 5 illustrates the roll channel control law architecture, which incorporates the desired response model, the inverting controller ( fK \), and the on-line neural network. The #ying qualities requirement in the roll axis is a "rst-order stability axis roll rate (p ) response given by
which is selected as the desired response model. The resulting pseudocontrol input to the inverting controller is where u (t) is the roll channel pseudocontrol, uL (t) is the roll channel adaptation signal (output of the neural network), and pR is the "ltered stability axis roll acceleration. For a linearly parameterized network, the network output is de"ned by
where are the basis functions of the network, and w L 3R, is its weighting vector. The weight update law is given by
The learning rate ( ) was selected as 20 for this application. The roll neural network is linear in sideslip, roll rate and yaw rate, and quadratic in angle of attack and the roll channel pseudocontrol. The pseudocontrol inputs to the network are passed through a sigmoidal activation function, (u ), to guarantee the existence of a "xed-point solution (required for the analytical proof of stability). The basis functions of the network ( G ) comprised the various combinations of products formed from the network's parameterizing variables. The network output is then formed as the sum of the products of the basis functions and their respective network weights. The roll neural network architecture is illustrated in Figure 6 . The #ying qualitites requirements in the pitch and yaw axes are speci"ed by the second-order transfer functions
Since both axes use second-order response models, the adaptive control architecture will be the same for these axes. This architecture is shown for the yaw channel in Figure 7 . The network weights are adapted using the law
The learning rates were selected to be ? "20 in the pitch axis and @ "20 in the yaw axis. The yaw neural network parameterization is identical to the roll channel. The pitch channel neural network is linearly parameterized with pitch rate and quadratically parameterized with angle of attack and the pitch pseudocontrol.
The integrated control e!ector management (ICEM) algorithm performs control allocation while optimizing selected performance objectives. It accepts moment commands from the inverting controller (d), control derivatives from the system identi"cation algorithm (B matrix), and the available control de#ections as inputs to generate the individual control e!ector commands (u). If the moment commands can not be satis"ed, the weighted error norm, #Bu!d# 5B , is minimized. The weighting matrix, = B , is used for axis prioritization by heavily weighting the errors in the critical axes. When the moment commands can be satis"ed, the redundancy in the control e!ector suite is used to satisfy the moment commands while driving the e!ectors toward a preferred position (u ).This notion is made precise with the objective to minimize (u!u )2= (u!u ) where = "=2 '0 subject to Bu"d.
The control e!ector preference vector, which comprised trim schedules and signals used to aid identi"cation of the control derivatives, is constrained to lie in the kernel of the B matrix by the control allocation algorithm and thus does not a!ect the vehicle's response. Quadratic programming algorithms are used to solve the resulting constrained optimization problem. Details of the control allocation algorithms are provided by Enns. Axis prioritization refers to the desire to give priority to achieving the moments commanded in a given axis when the available control power is insu$cient to achieve all commanded moments. Priority is given to axes which are statically unstable to prevent departures, as well as those critical to performing a given task (e.g. pitch axis during terrain following). This priority can be imposed through the control allocation algorithm via the = B weighting matrix shown above. Maneuver load alleviation refers to the utilization of the available control e!ectors in a manner which achieves the desired moments for the vehicle while minimizing the forces or moments (loads) at speci"ed points on the aircraft. E!ective load alleviation algorithms can reduce the structural requirements of the aircraft, thereby reducing weight and cost. Maneuverability is maintained by using the e!ectors in a way which keeps the loads within their acceptable boundaries, while maximizing the control power available to control the aircraft.
Maneuver load alleviation can be achieved using the on-line control alloction algorithms discussed above. The load induced by a given control e!ector is related to its position (i.e. larger de#ections tend to yield larger loads). The preference vector, u , employed by the control allocation algorithm can be used to drive the control e!ectors toward positions which minimize the loads on the aircraft. Since all of the preferred e!ector positions may not be attainable, the preference weighting matrix is used to assign a relative priority to various e!ectors being at their preferred position. This matrix re#ects the relative in#uence of the various e!ectors on the loads to be minimized. The system identi"cation module uses a least-squares algorithm to estimate the coe$cients of a basis function expansion representing the aerodynamic and propulsive forces and moments. These coe$cients include the vehicles stability and control derivatives. A singular value decomposition technique is used to eliminate measurements with low information content to prevent erroneous estimates. Filters on the pilot commands are used to generate signals which are added to the control e!ector preference vector for injection into the kernel of the control distribution matrix. These signals facilitate identi"cation of the control derivatives for surfaces which are ganged together by the control allocation function. This ganging causes the parameters to be colinear, which would normally prevent identi"cation of the individual parameters. The signals in the kernel of the control distribution matrix eliminate this colinearity and allow estimation of the individual parameters. This approach avoids injection of undesirable dither signals when the pilot is not maneuvering the aircraft. In addition, the signals in the kernel of the control distribution matrix can be tied to the magnitude of the pilot input, thereby allowing system identi"cation only during large maneuvers. Details of the system identi"cation algorithms are provided by Elgersma and Enns.
The notation used to describe the aircraft dynamics whose parameters are to be estimated is described below. Let
x3RL, u3RK, H3RL
; I, b3RO, f3RL
Any dynamical system can be written as the product of a coe$cient matrix, H, times a vector of basis functions, b(x, u), plus a residual. The residual can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number, q, of basis functions. However, this also increases the size of the coe$cient matrix, H, which must be recomputed when the system changes (e.g. due to battle damage to an aircraft).To keep the residual small, while using a minimal number of basis functions, a nominal function, f(x, u), which does not depend on any undetermined coe$cients can be separated out as shown below.
xR "f(x, u)#H*b(x, u)#residual
For an aircraft, the aerodynamics forces and moments could be represented by H * b(x, u), while all other terms of the dynamics may be put into f (x, u) . This is consistent with the fact that minor damage to the aircraft can signi"cantly change the aero coe$cients, while having only a small e!ect on the mass and moments of inertia. The system identi"cation approach assumes that x, u, and xR can be measured with sensors or accurately estimated. Then, by comparing the measured value of xR with the computed values of f(x, u) and b(x, u), the coe$cient matrix H can be computed. For a rigid aircraft, xR consists of translational acceleration of the e.g. vR 3R, and angular acceleration 3R. Translational acceleration, vR , can be measured with a single 3-axis accelerometer, while rotational accelerations, R , can be computed from measurements of three 3-axis non-collinear accelerometers or estimated by numerical di!erentiation and "ltering of the rotational rates.
After acquiring k samples, let
The G matrix is size q;k where k<q, and thus the equation to solve for H,
F"HG
represents an over-determined linear algebra problem.
If a priori knowledge on the approximate value of H is available, the solution can be biased to stay close to the preferred value, H . Let
H"H #H
and combine the last two equations, using a q;q weighting matrix =, to give
The least-squares solution is
If the [G, =] matrix is poorly conditioned, its inverse can be approximated using the singular value decomposition:
which yields
SIMULATION RESULTS
Non-linear simulation analysis of the recon"gurable control laws was conducted to test their ability to adapt to critical failure and damage scenarios and evaluate the stability and handling qualities of the vehicle following the critical failures and damage. Simulations were initiated from a trimmed #ight condition. Stick or pedal doublets, with a magnitude equal to half of the maximum de#ection, were then applied. The failure or damage was introduced 1 s after maneuver initiation. The stick or pedal input was not modi"ed after the failure or damage, thus requiring the recon"gurable control law to stabilize the vehicle (i.e. no pilot aiding to compensate for the failure/damage). Simulation results are shown for a longitudinal stick input at the ingress/egress #ight condition in Figure 8 . The simulation results compare the dynamic response of the nominal vehicle (solid line) to that with a missing left trailing edge #ap (dotted line). The damage occurs at 2 s (1 s after maneuver initiation).
The "rst two rows of plots compare the dynamic response parameters for the two conditions. These results show that the recon"gurable control law adapts to the damage and restores the tracking performance in the normal load factor (NL) response. The sideslip excursions caused by the damage are held to less than 43, while the rotational rates are stabilized.
The "nal set of plots compare the parameter identi"cation results for the two conditions. These plots show the dimensionalized control derivatives (rotational acceleration per e!ector Figure 8 . Performance of recon"gurable control law following failure/damage command) for the ailerons and trailing edge #aps. Control power estimates are generated based on the individual e!ectors, rather than collective and di!erential pseudocontrols, to capture the cross axis e!ects induced by failures and damage. For the failed condition, the left TEF derivatives should go to zero, while the remaining derivatives should be comparable to the nominal case (some di!erences may be induced due to trajectory deviations and variations in control surface utilization). The results show that the left TEF derivatives tend to zero as expected, while the right TEF derivatives track the nominal values. The damage induces some perturbation in the aileron derivatives prior to the estimates converging to their desired values.
Overall, the responses under the simulated damage condition achieve the goal of providing at least Level 3 #ying qualities under severe damage. The responses are stable and the rates adequately damped. More benign maneuvering (which would typically be the case under severe damage) would likely yield improved tracking results.
Good results were obtained for most scenarios (i.e. combinations of #ight condition, failures, damage, and pilot inputs). All Class 1 failures/damage were handled very well, with the dynamic responses being nearly identical to the nominal vehicle. The Class 2 failure/damage scenarios were handled by the recon"gurable control law for most inputs. Failures or damage during aggressive maneuvers can result in control power reductions that prevent stabilization and recovery. Modifying the inputs to aid in recovery from the failure/damage (i.e. pilot aiding in stabilizing the vehicle) may improve results at these conditions.
The bene"ts on integrating fault detection and identi"cation (FDI) algorithms into the recon"gurable control laws was also investigated via these non-linear simulations. The FDI algorithms were modelled as a "xed time delay in detecting locked or #oating control e!ector failures. The FDI algorithms provided no information about sustained battle damage. The FDI algorithms generated a #ag indicating whether an e!ector was locked or #oating. The system ID module uses this #ag to remove the failed e!ector from the regressor matrix, while the control allocation removes the failed e!ector from the B matrix used to allocate the moment commands. FDI information provided improved performance for locked and #oating actuator failures by allowing direct compensation for the failure.
CONCLUSIONS
A recon"gurable control approach has been developed based on direct adaptive control techniques and has demonstrated very good performance in non-linear simulations using tailless advanced "ghter aircraft. The direct adaptive approach reduces the criticality of system identi"cation for stabilizing the vehicle following failures and damage, and is supported by an analytical proof of stability. Follow-on research to mature these algorithms includes manned simulation and #ight testing.
